With regard to road safety, a research program started in January 2010 is focused on the analysis of driver behavior during driving simulator experiments with the aim to measure the effects of some of those variables; the relationships between environment and driver's characteristics are analyzed in depth. The experiments are conducted at the Transportation Laboratory of the Department of Structural and Transportation Engineering of the University of Padova in cooperation with the Department of Developmental Psychology (Cognition and Language Laboratory) using an ST Software five-screen configuration driving simulator.
With regard to road safety, a research program started in January 2010 is focused on the analysis of driver behavior during driving simulator experiments with the aim to measure the effects of some of those variables; the relationships between environment and driver's characteristics are analyzed in depth. The experiments are conducted at the Transportation Laboratory of the Department of Structural and Transportation Engineering of the University of Padova in cooperation with the Department of Developmental Psychology (Cognition and Language Laboratory) using an ST Software five-screen configuration driving simulator.
The aim of the studies reported here is to evaluate the potential impact on driving of the processing of a single spoken word. Because driving is a complex cognitive activity that involves the integration and coordination of a multitude of subprocesses, the authors narrowed the scope of the research to concentrate on one critical task involved in driving: driver braking response.
This analysis of driving behavior is an important field of investigation because of its implications for driving safety. In fact, the comprehension of the phenomena can affect significantly methodologies and equipment useful in reducing the risk of accidents.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first part, the authors present an overview of the studies on the potential impact on driving of the processing of words. In the second part, the authors describe the methodology and data collection, the data set characteristics, and the results of the experiments. In the last part, some conclusions and directions for further research are presented.
ThEorETical BackgrounD
In this section, the authors provide an overview of the main findings concerning the cognitive demand of the processing of an isolated word and braking response. The findings suggest that the processing of a single spoken word might interfere with driver braking response. Both of these lines of research use the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm (1) .
The PRP paradigm is used to examine the consequences of having to process two stimuli in rapid succession. Participants are asked to perform one task (Task 1) in response to the first stimulus and another task (Task 2) in response to the second stimulus. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the stimuli is varied across trials. In some trials, participants can complete Task 1 before the second stimulus appears (long SOA condition). In other trials, the second stimulus appears before participants can complete Task 1 (short SOA condition). Usually response times to Task 1 are unaffected by SOA. In contrast, reaction times (RTs) to Task 2 increase
The potential impact on driving of the processing of a single, auditorily presented word is analyzed in this work. Because driving is a complex cognitive activity that involves the integration and coordination of multiple subprocesses, the authors narrowed the scope of the research to concentrate on one critical task involved in driving: driver braking response. If two tasks have to be performed concurrently and both of them require access to a capacity-limited system, then performance in one or both of the tasks will dramatically worsen because the two processes will compete for access to cognitive resources. It has been shown that both word recognition and driving require central resources; therefore, these tasks are likely to interfere with each other. In the experiments, participants were required to perform two tasks during simulated driving. In the word recognition task, participants had to categorize auditorily presented words. In the braking task, participants depressed a brake pedal in response to the lead car's brake lights. The interval of time between the onset of the tasks' stimuli was varied. Braking responses were substantially slower as the overlap between tasks increased. This finding demonstrates that the processing of a single word hinders driving performance. The experiments carried out have significant implications in the field of road safety. Many situations, such as cell phone ringing, cell phone conversations, auditory tips from navigation systems, and auditory alerts from driver warning systems, are similar to those studied. The experiments suggest that all these situations can negatively affect a driver's response time, increasing the likelihood of near misses and accidents.
For several years, studies of driver behavior have been conducted through direct observations at the Transportation Laboratory of the University of Padova. Methods of analysis and interpretation have been developed to specify, estimate, and validate models for forecasting driver behavior in different traffic and geometric contexts. These studies have highlighted some difficulties concerning the direct observation of subjective or objective variables, such as driver's attention, tiredness, aggressiveness, and vehicle motion parameters; these variables are difficult or impossible to detect in real-world conditions. as SOA decreases; this increase in RTs to Task 2 is labeled the PRP effect. The decrease in Task 2 performance occurs because both tasks require access to the same capacity-limited mechanism, called central attention (2) . This mechanism capacity cannot operate simultaneously on two tasks; functionally, it constitutes a bottleneck (3) (4) (5) . Central attention can be devoted to the processing of only one task at a time. If two processes need central attention, then one of the two (likely the process that accesses central attention second) has to be put in suspension and wait until central attention is freed from the other process and made available again. If one of the two processes, or both, does not require central attention, then no PRP effect is expected. The PRP effect, therefore, can be seen as proof that the two processes (or at least one of their processing stages) require a resource-limited, domain-general, central attentional mechanism.
By means of the PRP paradigm, it has been shown that both the recognition (6, 7) and the production (8-13) of single words require central attention. For example, in the study by Dent et al., in the first task, participants were presented with pictures and were required to name them as quickly and accurately as possible, and in the second task, participants were presented with one of three possible tones and were instructed to classify them according to their pitch by pressing one of three buttons (10) . Results showed that RTs to the tone discrimination task increased as SOA decreased; that is, a PRP effect was observed. The conclusion that can be drawn, within the PRP framework, is that word production, despite being a highly practiced task, requires central resources.
The PRP paradigm has also been employed to investigate resource requirement of braking in simulated driving. In the study by Levy et al., participants performed two tasks concurrently during simulated driving (14) . In one task, they responded manually or vocally to the number of times a visual or auditory stimulus occurred; in the braking task, they depressed a brake pedal in response to the lead car's brake lights. The SOA between the two tasks was varied. A PRP effect was observed; RTs to the braking task increased as the SOA between the two tasks decreased. This result, within the PRP framework, implies that braking recruits central attention. The authors also observed that although dual-task slowing affects the movement of the driver's foot off the gas pedal and the moment in which the brake pedal is pressed, it does not affect the time required for the lateral movement from the gas to the brake. This result implies that the bottleneck in braking occurs mostly before response initiation.
If both word processing and braking recruit central attention, then these two tasks should compete for access to central attention, because central attention is a capacity-limited mechanism. The prediction here is that processing a single spoken word will postpone braking by delaying access to central resources.
In the studies reported in this paper, the authors put this prediction to the test. A driving simulator was used to achieve the experimental control necessary to examine dual-task interference between simulated driving and word processing and to obtain reliable observations of drivers' behavior (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) .
ExpErimEnTS Experiment 1
During the experiment, participants drove along a circuit 15.14 km (9.40 mi) long; the circuit was composed of four straight segments 3.0 km (1.86 mi) long connected by four wide curves [radius 0.5 km (0.31 mi)]. Participants were asked to drive as they normally would, keeping a safe distance from the lead vehicle. Participants were instructed to brake as soon as they became aware of the lead car braking. The maximum speed of the lead car was 80 km/h (49.69 mph). Daytime and good weather conditions were adopted in this scenario to allow good visibility. The lead car occasionally braked, requiring participants to depress the brake pedal to avoid a collision. Intermittently, participants had to perform a semantic decision task in response to an auditorily presented word. On the auditory presentation of a word, they had to vocally respond "yes" if the word was the name of an animal and "no" otherwise. By using a vocal response instead of a manual response, the authors aimed to prevent crosstalk between the generation of a response to the word and driving. Most of the time, participants performed either the braking task or the semantic decision task (single-task condition). On a subset of occasions, however, the braking task was performed shortly after the semantic decision task (dual-task conditions). On the dual-task trials, the SOA between the semantic decision and the braking task was manipulated so that the lead car braked either 400 ms or 1,500 ms after the word was presented. In the experimental dual-task conditions, the semantic decision task always preceded the braking task; to prevent participants from interpreting the semantic decision task as a signal of the upcoming braking task, the authors added a dual-task filler condition in which the braking task was presented 1,500 ms before the semantic decision task.
If word processing and braking compete for accessing central attention, RTs to the braking task should increase in the short SOA condition. If the two processes do not compete for access to central attention, RTs to the braking task should be unaffected by the SOA manipulation.
Method
participants Twenty-four students (nine females) from the University of Padova voluntarily took part in the experiment. They were all native Italian speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants had an average of 4 years of driving experience (minimum 2 years). Design A two-task (semantic decision and braking) per two SOAs (400 ms and 1,500 ms) within-subject design was used.
materials For the semantic decision task, 162 words were used; 120 served as experimental stimuli and 42 served as filler stimuli. Half of the words were names of animals and half were names of objects. The 120 experimental words were divided into three blocks of 40 words (20 names of animals) for counterbalancing across participants and SOAs. Blocks were balanced in terms of letter length, frequency of occurrence (23) , and mean number of phonological and orthographic neighbors (all Student's t-statistics < |1|).
For the braking task, the stimulus was the turning on of the brake lights of the lead car.
apparatus The simulation system used is a fixed-base driving simulator produced by ST Software. It includes a realistic cockpit, three networked computers, and five high-definition screens (Figure 1a) ; the system is also equipped with a Dolby Surround sound system.
A script developed in ST Software language was used to present the auditory stimuli to participants.
To detect participants' responses, a PST Serial Response Box (Model 200a) and an Audio-Technica ATR-1200 cardioid dynamic vocal microphone controlled by E-Prime 1.0 software were used (Figure 1b) . This equipment allowed the detection of responses with 2-ms precision.
The temporal alignment between the PC used to control the driving simulator and the PC dedicated to E-Prime was provided by means of RS232 serial communication.
procedure Participants were tested individually. Before the experiment, participants were instructed about the tasks. The main task the participants had to accomplish was a car-following task. The average speed of the leading car was 80 km/h (49.69 mph). In the experiment, the leading car stopped (signaled to participants by the red light stopping signal of the leading car turning on) after 7, 15, or 20 s starting from the instant in which the vehicles (leader and follower) reached the stable condition corresponding to 80 km/h speed. When the leading car stopped, participants had to press the brake pedal. In the braking single-task condition (a filler condition composed of 42 trials), only the braking task was presented. In the semantic decision single-task condition (42 trials), a word was auditorily presented. Participants were required to classify the word as the name of an animal or of an object as quickly and accurately as possible. Participants responded "yes" if the word was the name of an animal and "no" otherwise. In the dual-task, experimental condition (80 trials), the semantic decision task and the braking task were presented in rapid succession, with the semantic decision task always preceding the braking task. The SOA between the tasks was 400 ms (40 trials) or 1,500 ms (40 trials). In the dual-task condition, participants were required to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to both tasks. RTs and accuracy were recorded.
The experimental session was preceded by a practice session of 20 trials (10 single-task trials and 10 dual-task trials).
Results
Semantic Decision Naming errors (1%) and apparatus failures (4%) were removed before the analysis of RTs. RTs falling above or below 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of each subject in each cell were considered outliers and removed before analysis (4%).
Analysis showed a small but significant 23-ms effect of SOA on the semantic decision task, t(23) = 2.1, p = .043; RTs were faster in the long SOA condition than the short SOA condition (Table 1) .
There were no significant effects in the analysis of errors (t < |1|).
Braking There were no errors in this task. Outliers (5%) were removed before the analysis of RTs. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a condition (SOA of 400, SOA of 1,500, single-task filler) as a within-subject factor was performed on the RTs. Analysis showed a main effect of the condition, F(2, 46) = 68.7, mean square error (MSE) = 7,214, p < .001. Paired comparisons revealed that the main effect of the condition was from the RTs being 254 ms slower in the short SOA condition than the long SOA condition, t(23) = 8.9, p < .001 (Table 1 ). The 244-ms difference between the short SOA condition and the single-task filler condition was also significant, t(23) = 8.1, p < .001. RTs in the long SOA condition did not significantly differ from RTs in the single-task filler condition (873 ms), t(23) = 1, p = .318.
Discussion of Results
The results are clear-cut: as the overlap between the semantic decision and the braking task increased (i.e., in the short SOA condition), braking performance decreased. Performance in the long SOA condition did not differ from performance in the single-task filler condition; this result implies that the task of braking in the long SOA condition is comparable with the task of braking in singletask conditions. Because dual-task interference cannot occur in the single-task condition, it can be inferred that dual-task interference had not occurred in the long SOA condition. These results are easily accounted for by both tasks (i.e., word processing and braking) requiring access to a bottleneck in central processing (central attention). Word processing gains access to central attention first because the word stimulus was the first stimulus presented. If the lead car's brake lights turn on shortly after the presentation of the word stimulus, the stage of the braking process that requires central attention cannot be executed until word processing frees the central processor. Once central attention is freed, it can be devoted to the processing of the braking process. When the lead car's brake lights turn on long after the presentation of the word stimulus, as in the long SOA condition, the processing of the word will not bottleneck the system, and thus there will not be delays in the braking process.
There is an issue that needs to be addressed at this point. The dual-task interference reported in the PRP literature is similar regardless of the similarity of input and output modalities (24) . To minimize interference from interactions between the input and output processes of the two tasks, the authors kept the modalities for the two tasks separated: auditory and vocal for the semantic decision task, visual and manual for the braking task. If the dual-task slowing is not from input or output processes, the following conclusion can be drawn: whatever the stages requiring central attention, they must be central stage, that is, postinput and preoutput stages. If this is the case, the 254-ms delay is all because of central interference.
There is, however, a further possibility. De Jong extended the standard bottleneck model by including an additional motor-related bottleneck, located at the response initiation stage (25) [also see work by Bratzke et al. (26) ]. The reason is that if the length of the response execution stage (i.e., the postcentral output stage) is longer than the length of the central stage of the second process (see Figure 2) , then a cost is observed that is over and above possible costs from central bottlenecking. In Figure 2 , prolonged motor processing (lower panel) propagates onto the RT for Task 2 (as indicated by the arrow) because of an additional motor-related bottleneck. Bratzke et al. manipulated the length of the response execution stage (26) . Participants had to respond to Task 1 with either one action or a sequence of actions. In Experiment 1, the response to Task 1 was produced vocally and the response to Task 2 (a tone discrimination task) was produced manually. In Experiment 2, the response to Task 1 was executed manually and the response to Task 2 (again, tone discrimination) was executed vocally. In both experiments, the long response sequence prolonged the RT for Task 2, and this effect was reduced with decreasing temporal overlap of the two tasks. Bratzke et al. thus demonstrated motor interference between different effectors (26) .
According to an estimate by Costa et al., the postlexical, execution portion of word production lasts for around 400 ms (27) . So the execution, motor portion of word production might well be seen as long and therefore capable of generating a bottleneck at the response initiation stage instead of the central stage. If this were the case, then the 254-ms effect of delay the authors found in Experiment 1 might be due in part to the central bottleneck (competition for central attention) and in part to the postcentral, response initiation bottleneck.
In Experiment 2, the authors attempted to disentangle these two sources of dual-task cost. The two tasks were, again, semantic decision and braking. In the semantic decision task of Experiment 1, participants had to respond to both words denoting animals (yes) and words denoting objects (no). In Experiment 2, participants responded "yes" to the words denoting animals and withheld a response otherwise. That is, a go-no-go procedure was employed. In the no-go condition, participants made no overt response. Therefore, if a PRP effect was observed in this no-go condition, the dual-task slowing has to be ascribed to competition for central, attentional resources and not to the bottleneck at the response initiation stage (25) ; for a similar argument, also see work by Van Selst and Jolicoeur (28) .
Experiment 2

Method
participants Eighteen students (six females) from the University of Padova voluntarily took part in the experiment. They were all native Italian speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants had an average of 4.2 years of driving experience (minimum 2 years). Design A two-task (semantic decision and braking) per two gono-go (go or no-go) per two SOA (400 ms and 1,500 ms) withinsubject design was used.
materials See Experiment 1. apparatus See Experiment 1.
procedure The procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 1 except for the introduction of the go-no-go manipulation. The experiment was divided into two blocks. In one block, participants responded "yes" to the names of animals and withheld a response otherwise. In the other block, participants responded "no" to the names of objects and withheld a response otherwise. The order of the presentation of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
Results
Semantic Decision (go Trials) Naming errors (2%) and apparatus failures (1%) were removed before analysis of the RTs. RTs falling above or below 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of each subject in each cell were considered outliers and removed before analysis of the RTs (4%). Table 2 reports mean RTs according to conditions. Analysis showed that SOA has no effect on the semantic decision task, t(17) = 1.7, p > .05.
Braking There were no errors in this task. Outliers (5%) were removed before analysis of the RTs. A first ANOVA with a condition (SOA of 400, SOA of 1,500, single-task filler) as a withinsubject factor was conducted on the RTs. (In this analysis, RTs were collapsed across the go and the no-go conditions.) Analysis showed that the main effect of the condition was significant, F(2, 34) = 43.6, MSE = 5,184, p < .001. Paired comparisons revealed that the main effect of the condition was from RTs in the short SOA condition (1,152 ms) being 201 ms slower than the RTs in the long SOA condition (951 ms), t(17) = 8.6, p < .001. The 13-ms difference between the long SOA condition and the single-task filler condition (964 ms) was not significant, t < |1|. The 188-ms difference between the short SOA condition and the single-task filler condition was significant, t(17) = 6.8, p < .001.
In a second analysis, the authors tested for differences between the performance in the go and the no-go conditions. RTs were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA with the factors go-no-go (braking following semantic decision go trials and following semantic decision no-go trials) and SOA (400 ms and 1,500 ms) as within-subject. Analyses showed a significant main effect of go-no-go, F(1, 17) = 47.8, MSE = 7,305.9, p < .001, because of slower braking RTs after go trials than no-go trials. Analyses also showed a significant main effect of SOA, F(1, 17) = 74.8, MSE = 9,682.8, p < .001, from braking RTs increasing as SOA decreases.
However, the two effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 17) = 51.3, MSE = 4,299.3, p < .001. The PRP effect was larger for the trials of braking after the semantic go decision than for the trials of braking after a semantic no-go decision (312 ms and 90 ms, respectively). Planned pair comparisons revealed that both the 312-ms PRP effects in the go trial condition, t(17) = 8.5, p < .001, and the 90-ms PRP effect in the no-go trial condition, t(17) = 6.4, p < .001, were significant.
Discussion of Results
In this experiment, the authors tested for central dual-task interference over and above response initiation interference. The results are clear-cut: word processing interfered with braking in two distinct processing stages: in accessing central attention and at the response initiation stage. As in the first experiment, braking performance in the long SOA condition did not differ from braking performance in the single-task filler condition. This result suggests that braking in the long SOA condition was substantially unaffected by dualtask interference effects and thus that braking in that condition is comparable with braking in single-task conditions.
The most interesting evidence of this second experiment is that the sole mental manipulation of the meaning of a single, auditorily presented word significantly interferes with braking. If an action is required in response to the meaning of the word, then ulterior interference is observed. This second, motor-related interference, is numerically bigger than the central, attentional interference.
Because in this experiment, as well as in the previous one, the authors compared braking RTs in two SOAs only, the size of the interference observed might indeed be an underestimation of the actual size. The authors had assumed in the long SOA condition that RTs for the braking task would be asymptotic to the (ideal) level of a single-task condition (29) . However, it might be possible that in some trials of the long SOA condition, the performance of the participants in the braking task was still influenced by the go-no-go semantic decision task. That is, it might be possible that in some trials of the long SOA condition, a residual dual-task cost had slowed braking RTs. This possible residual dual-task slowing in the long SOA condition might have led to an underestimation of the actual size of the interference.
pracTical implicaTionS
In general terms, the interference that a person suffers while performing more than one task at the same time represents a relevant issue from both the theoretical and applied points of view. The relevance of this issue becomes evident if one considers the possible implications for safety of interference taking place while driving.
There are many situations in which distracting tasks can reduce the capability of drivers to perform the primary task, thus leading to potentially disastrous effects (crash risk). This risk appears relevant especially when one considers that some events that occur during driving are highly unpredictable (e.g., the sudden appearance of an obstacle).
The understanding of the cognitive processing limitations of multitask performance lies at the core of the understanding of the functioning of distraction caused by central factors (factors that have to do with the coordination of the cognitive processes and with the distribution of the cognitive resources in a multitask situation) that might occur (and do occur) while driving. Talking (30) or listening to something or somebody, which are rather common and unavoidable activities, can lead to attention reduction. For example, it has been shown that the use of in-vehicle devices (phone, in-vehicle communication system, etc.) leads to interference with driving as a consequence of concurrent task demands (31) . It has also been reported that the interference associated with cell phone use primarily relates to attentional factors rather than to peripheral factors such as holding the phone (32); this finding reveals potential ineffectiveness of laws that restrict the use of handheld devices but allow the use of hands-free devices.
Nowadays there is wide use of in-vehicle devices that can potentially interfere with subtasks involved in driving (for instance, braking), especially in an unpredictable emergency. It appears difficult, however, to prevent drivers from using such devices. If the interpretation of auditory stimuli requires cognitive resources (as occurs with the processing of a word) then, in a self-defeating way, a driver warning system that uses alerts (e.g., auditory signals) that need to be cognitively manipulated (i.e., that need to be interpreted) might potentially interfere with the primary task and worsen driver performance by taking cognitive resources away.
Considering the use of in-vehicle devices as safe is still a strongly debated subject that mainly relates to the nature of driving itself.
Therefore, the understanding of the causes and of the dynamic of the multitask interference (caused by, for example, talking, listening, or using in-vehicle devices) has to be considered fundamental to providing quantitative findings that might be useful for defining effective road safety policies as well as for designing and validating equipment (rear-end collision avoidance systems, human-machine interfaces, etc.) able to prevent the unwanted consequence of interference.
The findings of the work described in this paper appear significant and relevant to interesting and socially useful developments.
gEnEral DiScuSSion of rESulTS
In both experiments, the authors observed a substantial slowing of RTs in the braking task at a short SOA condition (400 ms) compared with a long SOA condition (1,500 ms). The delay was 254 ms in Experiment 1 and 311 ms in the go condition of Experiment 2. At a speed of 80 km/h (49.69 mph), a delay of about 300 ms translates into a distance of 6.70 m. Despite being an overpracticed task, spoken word processing (including the manipulation of the meaning needed to extract the semantic category of the word and the uttering of a simple, three-phoneme, monosyllabic word such as "yes") prolongs braking for a substantial distance.
Unlike Experiment 1 and the go condition of Experiment 2, the no-go condition of Experiment 2 did not require a response to the word stimulus. This condition required processing the word sufficiently to extract its meaning (to classify the stimulus as an object); but once the stimulus was categorized, participants did not have to emit any response. By employing this experimental technique, the authors prevented any interference between the initiation of the motor program of the semantic decision and the initiation of the motor program of the braking task. However, braking was still 90 ms slower at the short SOA condition than at the long SOA condition; 90 ms at a speed of 80 km/h (49.69 mph) translates into almost 2 m. So, a simple manipulation of the meaning of the word stimulus (as required in retrieving information about a single word's semantic category) significantly, and substantially, interferes with braking. In addition, the slowing observed in the no-go condition has to be interpreted as a result of the two processes competing for access to central attention.
The experiments carried out appear significant in terms of their possible applications in road safety. There are many situations that can be assimilated to those analyzed during the experiments, such as cell phone ringing, cell phone conversations (even using hands-free devices), passenger conversations, auditory tips from navigation systems, auditory alerts from driver warning systems, and so forth. As demonstrated by the experiments, all these situations can negatively affect a driver's RT, leading to potentially dangerous situations.
The results constitute an interesting starting point for future research. For example, it has been shown that dual-task performance degrades with age (33), especially with respect to the strategies of task coordination, and therefore it becomes relevant to investigate how aging and driving interact in dual-task settings. Other variables that affect driving in dual-task conditions and have serious implications for driving safety are tiredness and aggressiveness.
Other than intraindividual or interindividual variables, dual-task paradigms can be used to investigate the capacity demands, and therefore the susceptibility to interference, of driving tasks other than braking, such as the estimation of the speed of other vehicles as well as the interaction between that estimation and visual features (e.g., size).
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